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LAWF ARE: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Tawia Ansah•
This Article offers a rhetorical analysis of the term "lawfare. " It
examines the term within the context of its historical genesis, and reviews its
evolving definition. Drawing upon insights from non-legal disciplines, the
Article argues that rhetorically, "lawfare" indicates alternative and critical
ways to think of law in relation to war.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In an essay published shortly after the events of 9/11 and the U.S.
responsive attack on Afghanistan, Colonel (as he then was; now Major
General) Charles J. Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force attorney (JAG), introduced
1
the term "lawfare" within the discourse on law and war. In Dunlap's essay,
the term had the specific meaning of indexing law itself as a weapon and a
• LL.B. (Toronto), Ph.D. (Columbia). Visiting Professor, Case Western Reserve School
of Law. Professor of Law, New England Law Boston. I am grateful to Professor Michael
Scharf for inviting me to moderate a panel at the "Lawfare!" conference at Case on September 10-11, 2010. I thank Dean Robert Rawson for a summer stipend. My thanks to Professor
Jessie Hill for reading an earlier draft and for her invaluable comments and critiques; to
Professor Bob Strassfeld for helpful discussions on the Article's themes; to Ms. Kirsten
Resnick for research assistance; and to the student editors at JIL, whose detailed comments
improved the quality of the prose.
1
See generally Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21si Conflicts (Nov. 29, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at
Harvard University, Carr Center, Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, available at http://www.duke.edu/- pfeaver/dunlap.pdf.
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strategy of war. 2 But Dunlap's use of "lawfare" also implied various significations having to do with the broader issue of the parameters of law in relation to war, and of both law and war in relation to the exercise of governmental power. Several years later, in an essay published in 2009, Dunlap
"refined" his own definition of the term "lawfare,"3 taking account of the
subsequent career of the "war on terror. " 4
In this brief essay, I propose a rhetorical analysis of law fare .5 I will
be concerned with both Dunlap's intended meanings and the textual implications and latent significations within the discourse on law and war from
which the term "lawfare" evolves and which it references. That is, I want to
know what ideas attach to law and to war as specific human products, and
how lawfare expresses ideas about each of them, and to ideas about their
interrelationship. At its simplest, a rhetorical analysis suggests that lawfare
might express a certain expansiveness of law in relation to war, and vice
versa. Lawfare might also index the limits of law's idiom as war, as well as
war's representation of law. Rhetorically, then, "lawfare" projects the will
to expansion between law and war, inter se. And linguistically, it subtends
the point at which "law" and "war" are contained within, and constrained
by, each other.

2

Id. at 2.
The second article was published in a military law journal. See Major General Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., law/are : A Decisive Element of 21'1 Century Conflicts? 34 JOINT FORCE
QUARTERLY 54 (3rd quarter 2009), at 35.
4
The term itself is not without controversy. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Obama 's War Over
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 20 I 0, at A3, http://www.nytimes.com/20I0/01/17/magazine/I 7
Terror-t.html?pagewanted=all (Rather than seeing terrorism as the challenge of our time,
Obama rejects the phrase "war on terror" altogether, hoping to recast the struggle as only one
of a number of vital challenges confronting America. The nation is at war with al-Qaeda,
Obama says, but not with terrorism, which, as he understands it, is a tactic, not an enemy).
See also, e.g., Conor Gearty, The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment, Review Article of
Bruce Ackerman's Before The Next Attack, Preserving Civil liberties in an Age of Terrorism
(citation omitted), 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 183 (2008) at 183 ("The attacks on New York
and Washington on 11 September, 2001 have provided the casus for this phantom bel/i and
repetition of the supposed fact of this war by senior officials in the Bush administration,
including the President himself, has gradually- in true post-modernist style- made it true.").
Gearty posits a strong opposition both to the "war on terror," the war paradigm it encapsulates, and the consequent conception of law as "excluded" thereby. Gearty posits a strong
opposition both to the "war on terror," the war paradigm it encapsulates, and the consequent
conception of law as "excluded" thereby. Gearty posits a strong opposition both to the "war
on terror," the war paradigm it encapsulates, and the consequent conception of law as "excluded" thereby.
5
See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Reading Law Reading; Or, literature as law's Other (Princeton Mellon Seminar, Spring 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/facultyworkshops/brooks-reading-law-reading.pdf (last visited June l, 2010) at 12 (explaining that a
rhetoric or "poetics" of lawfare might "force [one] to confront the textuality and rhetoricity
of the law, the ways in which it makes meaning as well as the meanings it makes.").
3
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The dual themes, then, in this rhetorical analysis of lawfare are expansion and containment. The working thesis is that conceptually, we think
of war as an alternative to law, a deeply felt mythology captured in Cicero's
famous saying in Pro Milone, "inter armes silent leges," or "during war, law
is silent." Likewise, we think of law as a constraint upon the sovereign's
power to declare and conduct war. In that mythology, war is violent and
irrational, while law is pacific, deliberative, and rational. But of course the
relationship between law and war is more complicated: war is itself a "construct" of law, 6 just as much as war, ontologically, tests the basis and the
limits oflaw. 7
At any given historical moment, these ideas and mythologies are
given greater or lesser expression. Lawfare indexes a specific shape to the
ideas we harbor about the relationship between law and war. Thus, "lawfare" as a term of art has its own specific, intended, and, indeed, doctrinal
definitions, and the literature on lawfare within the past decade certainly
attests to this. 8
What this Article hopes to contribute is a sense of the implied
meanings and projected significations beyond doctrinal definition. The deployment of lawfare registers the extent to which a conception of law as formalistic and instrumental to war has become normative. The point of a rhetorical analysis of lawfare is to index a recognition of this and to interrogate
the consequences for law outside of the war context. The object is to treat
lawfare as a "threshold" concept between law and war, and thereby excavate the potential for alternative meaning-production. The object is to think
through lawfare as a term that captures a certain meaning of law in order to
apprehend alternative ways of thinking, more objectively and less naively
(mythically) about law in relation to war.
Lawfare's doctrinal meaning, as described in Parts I and II, suggests
a bounded, or enclosed, conception of law within which law's relationship
to war subtends law's capture and colonization by war: the more "war" is
indexed as metaphor in legal discourse, and the more this reflects the entrenchment of a war paradigm governing legal thought, the more law be6

Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Constrnction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. l (2004).
7
See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM, (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos, 2006)(discussing origins of law in
relation to different forms of war; e.g., "The essential point is that, within the Christian
sphere, wars among Christian princes were bracketed wars. They were distinguished from
wars against non-Christian princes and peoples," etc., at 58).
8
See, e.g., Brooke Goldstein, Aaron Eitan Meyer, Legal Jihad: How Islamist Lawfare
Tactics are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395 (2009); Tung Yin,
Boumediene and Law/are, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865 (2009); Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military Lawyers at the Strategic Level, ARMY
LAW., Sept. 2006.
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comes pregnant with war value. Lawfare, doctrinally, represents the loss of
a sense of law as other in relation to war. In the alternative, however, lawfare imagined as a threshold concept might point to the recognition of a
conception of law that maintains a relationship-----contingent, provisional,
historical, and imperfect-with war rather than a seamless collapse within
it.
At stake, then, in a rhetorical analysis of lawfare is both a critique
of the war paradigm that it represents and enforces, and a recognition of the
contingency of law in relation to the paradigm, whatever that paradigm is,
within which it is situated. What I hope to establish in this Article is the
relational aspect of law. Lawfare as projection and the case study, so to
speak, of the "war on terror," makes stark how important it is to remember
that law is never pure, is always contextual. Law cannot be divorced from
its milieu. Thus, a rhetorical analysis of lawfare allows us to look at law
more objectively, to see what has happened to law, under the aegis of war.
In Part II, I review the nexus of law and war from a historical and
doctrinal perspective and I analyze the discourses of power contemporaneous to lawfare's early deployment within the context of the "war on terror."
The question here will be how much lawfare imports, and reflects its pre2001 history. In Part III, I review Dunlap's evolving definitions of the term.
In Part IV, drawing upon analytical methodologies outside law (e.g., theology and psychoanalysis) to underline the concept of law as relational both
within and beyond the war model, I see lawfare as a threshold concept and
as a "passage." This enables me to look at the conflicting desires and investments harbored by the term in its deployment as an instrument of war
andoflaw.
In the result, I conclude that lawfare represents a traditionally
bounded or "determinate" view of law in relation to war. This view renders
the law-war nexus dyadic and inevitable: expansion and constraint on the
continuum between war and the criminal justice system ratifies law as the
legitimation and the formal/instrumental expression, merely, of different
forms of violence. A critique of lawfare from a rhetorical perspective submits a relational view of law ,9 a view that requires thinking of law as always
and already "related" to an outside or a beyond of the law/war nexus.
Whence, what will "constrain" or attenuate the resort to war (and the ac9
This will be explored in Part III and the Conclusion. For an idea of a "relational" theory
of law, I borrow from Ahsan Mirza's review of Foucau/t 's Law, Ahsan Mirza, Book Note, 47
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 617 (2009) (reviewing PETER FITZPATRICK & BEN GOLDER, FOUCAULT'S
LAW (2009)). Mirza notes that contrary to the popular "expulsion" theory of law in Foucault's thought, law in Foucault's modernity is '"the uneasy, ambivalent relation' between
'law as a determinate and contained entity' and 'law as thoroughly illimitable and as responsive to what lies outside or beyond its position for the time being,' 'law as a law of possibility, contingency, and liability."' Id. at 618.
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quiescence in a "war paradigm" 10 to resolve conflicts) may not be law in the
traditional sense of an opposition between the war paradigm and crime paradigm.11 Rather, war-or, perhaps more precisely, dehumanizing violence, 12 including the violence of the law- may be constrained by a conception of law that embodies relational thought.
I borrow from theology and psychoanalysis to suggest that the more
formal or bounded view of law already harbors this juridical desire in relation to war, but that the war paradigm suppresses and elides it-again, and
as such, as an aspect of the paradigm itself. Thinking of lawfare, then,
beyond its definitional limits to its linguistic and cultural significationsthat is, figuring lawfare as a border 13 concept between law and not law, war
and not war-gives us a sense of its potential discursive deployment as critique of the war paradigm. 14
10

Ganesh Sitaraman notes that the "war paradigm" must be inclusive of"a hybrid model
of law, between war and crime, that is better tailored to terrorists' tactics." He suggests that
the paradigm include counterinsurgency, the current strategy in the war in Afghanistan. See
Ganesh Sitararn, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1745, 1833 (2009).
11
But cf Gearty, supra note 4, at 7 (As an alternative to the war paradigm, "What does
exist is a framework of criminal law which is informed by principle certainly and controlled
to some degree ... by a range of more or less embedded rights but which is nevertheless
always on the move, the substance of the crimes themselves and the procedural framework
for their determination and punishment being in a perpetual state of flux.").
12
This aspect of warfare was vividly presented in a recent PBS, Frontline: The Wounded
Platoon (PBS May 17, 2010), on soldiers returning from the war zone and suffering from
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). The soldiers reported randomly killing civilians on the
slightest pretext. As one soldier put it: "It didn't matter whether they were armed or not.
They were simply 'hajjis,' they weren't human." A psychologist advised the solder that,
"You had to dehumanize the enemy in order to kill him . . .What you're suffering is a 'normal' response to an 'abnormal' situation. Thaw was abnormal; this is normal."
13
See, e.g., Simon Addison, Book Review, 21 J. REFUGEE STUD. 414 (reviewing
BORDERSCAPES: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES AND POLITICS AT TERRITORY'S EDGE (Prem Kumar
Rajararn & Carl Grundy-Warr eds. U . of Minnesota P., 2007) (the border is "a relational
practice for the production of otherness. The border... is a multivalent and constantly contested process through which the limits of sovereign power and the boundaries of political
community are negotiated." Addison notes further that to analyze the border "only in terms
of law ' repeats the ruse of sovereign control and rationality integral to the maintenance of
sovereign power."').
14
Critiques of the war paradigm include Amos Guiora, Self-Defense: from the Wild West
to 9111: Who, What, When, 41 CORNELL INT' L L.J. 631 (2008); Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note,
Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 985 (2008);
Christina D. Elmore, Comment, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing Combatants
from Civilians in the War against Terrorism, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 213 (2008) (war paradigm
based on an "antiquated state-based model," at 231 ); Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms:
Good Neighbors Make Good law and Good Policy in a Time of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 555 (2008) ("state-centeredness of a war paradigm" gives "higher profile and more
opportunities" to al-Qaeda, at 577). But cf David Glazier, Playing By the Rules: Combating
Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARYL. REv. 957, 983 (2009) ("A principle
advantage of the war paradigm is that it is self-limiting. There a{e formal legal prerequisites

92

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 43:87

II. WARBYLAW
Lawfare as a border concept expresses and projects conflicting desires concerning the relationship between law and war. In this first part, I
review the historical context of lawfare's origins (as a legal term). Here, I
look at the doctrine of the international laws of war, and the debates around
American power before 9/11. As I will argue in Part III, lawfare expresses a
strict view of the war as separate from international legal limits (law "and"
war), but also continuous with, and legitimated by, domestic law as such.
This latter view maintains the basic rubric of lawfare as paradigmatic of the
war framework.

A.

Law as War

There has been much criticism of the war paradigm (or the war
framework) used to characterize the 9/11 events and the subsequent U.S.
response. One element of the critique was that the 9/11 terrorist attack was
not an "act of war" but rather a "crime," whence the Bush Administration's
resort to a "war" rather than the criminal justice paradigm in pursuing its
remedies was fatally flawed. 15 Following what the critics consider this original error, the problem of how to characterize and adjudicate those captured
by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and other places where the terrorists were
sought led to a protracted debate about how to treat the detainees. 16 The
debate centered on whether the detainees should be treated as war criminals,
thereby according them prisoner of war status under the laws of war, or
whether they should be granted all the procedural protections of ordinary
criminals under the domestic and international criminal justice laws. 17
It was within this context that Dunlap introduced the term "lawfare," and this seemed to index the newness of the legal matrix or pressure
in relation to this war, or this extension of the modem definition of warfare.
Nathaniel Berman, however, notes that whilst the relationship between law
and war is ancient, what does seem new is the extent to which the recent
events-in which he includes the "fourteen year conflict with Iraq"- have
destabilized the traditional legal bases for determining the border between
under both domestic and international law for its lawful invocation."); See also, Matthew C.
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (making a similar argument to Glazier's).
15
See, e.g., Johannes van Aggelen, The Consequences of Unlawful Preemption and the
Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of its Victims, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 86
(2009) (report from the High Conunissioner for Human Rights concluding that "the U.S.
paradigm, by conflicting and confusing acts of terrorism with acts of war, is legally flawed
and sets a dangerous precedent.").
16
Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?, BBC NEWS, JAN. 21, 2002, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/l 773140.strn.
11
Id.
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war and not war. 18 With this destabilization, other separations (i.e., this is a
war; this is not a war but a revolution; etc.) are both unsettled and become
available to strategic instrumentalization by all sides. I will describe Berman's theory.
Berman's answer to the question, "what is war?" counters the popular view that law-whether conceptualized as the criminal justice system or
as the international prohibition against "wars of aggression"-is designed to
constrain war. On the contrary, Berman argues, law has always facilitated
"certain forms of officially sanctioned violence." 19 He writes:
First, law's role in relation to war is primarily not one of opposition but of
construction- the facilitation of war through the establishment of a separate legal sphere immunizing some organized violence from normal legal
sanction and, inevitably, privileging certain forms of violence at the expense of others. Secondly, the forms of this legal construction of war are
highly contingent, the subject of historical variation and political contestation. Thirdly, the legal construction of war as a separate sphere has been
considerably destabilized in our time, in particular by the strategic instrumentalization of the legal categories by state and non-state participants in
violence. Both the ''war on terror" and the fourteen year conflict with Iraq
provide paradigmatic instances of these phenomena. 20
Berman notes the distinction internal to the laws of war are drawn
between the right to go to war, the justness of the cause, "jus ad helium,"
and the conduct of the war once a war has begun, the ''jus in bello." 21 These
two have different aims and historically were meant to be separate. The ''jus
ad bellum" prohibits certain kinds of violence altogether (a war of aggression, for instance). 22 But even if one party begins such a war, both parties
must conduct themselves according to "jus in hello," also known as "international humanitarian law."23 "Jus in hello" does not depend upon the justness of the war; it referred only to the conduct, and was based on the moral
equality of belligerents, whereupon prisoners captured by either side had a
right to an immunity (privileged combatants). 24
In the second instance, as Berman notes, the line between the "lex
specialis" of war and the "lex generalis" of the criminal justice system,
whether international or domestic, was also "destabilized" by the events of
25
the last decade. Specifically, was terrorism an "act of war," bringing a
18

Berman:, supra note 6.

19

Id.
Id.
Id at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.

20

21
22
23

24
2s
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state's reaction to it within the laws of war (''jus in bello")? Or was it a
"criminal act," requiring a state's response to be more like a police action
than a declaration of war? 26
Third, the shifting back and forth between the criminal paradigm
and the war paradigm exacerbated the destabilized categories-both within
"lex specialis" and between the laws of war and the criminal justice system.
Berman's argument is that neither the destabilization nor its strategic instrumentalization for partisan advantage by all parties is anything new. 27 As
such, Berman writes, "Construction, contestation, instrumentalizationthese are the key challenges for understanding the role of law in relation to
war in our time."28
Of particular interest here is the last term: Berman notes that a
greater problem than contesting the boundaries is their instrumentalization. 29 It is here that lawfare makes its entrance, i.e., as one form of instrumentalizing the contested borders between legal spheres ("lawfare campaigns," to use Dunlap's phrase3°), as well as a descriptive term for the strategic exploitation of the legal construction of war. As discussed further in
Part III of this Article, lawfare expresses this constructive sense of legal
encompassment, of occupying the entire discursive field of the definition of
war-and not war- including the fact of divisional instability. Lawfare also
projects a strategic expansiveness, as if to counter the instrumental "lawfare
campaigns" of the other side.
Despite the legal construction of war and the posit that law is therefore not "opposed" in any juridical sense to war, there is a sense in which
society reposes such a desire in law, and that this constitutes a powerful
mythology of law's relation to war. Thus, Berman notes that ''jus ad helium," especially in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, prohibiting war, is
often interpreted as giving expression to such a desire. 31 Berman cautions,
26

Id at 7- 8.
Id at 7 (Some may view this destabilization of the legal construction of war as tending
to produce a synthesis between the laws of war and not-war; others may view it as tending
towards the abolition of one or the other sphere. By contrast, I argue that recent trends would
better be viewed as making the distinction between the two spheres available for strategic
instrumentalization. Rather than contesting the line between war and not-war, those engaged
in such instrumentalization employ the distinction itself for partisan advantage- seeking to
achieve practical or discursive gains through shifting back and forth between war and notwar.").
28
Id. at 8.
29 Id
30
Dunlap, supra note l , at 36.
31
Berman, supra note 6, at n.9 (jus ad bellum "enshrined in the League Covenant, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN Charter" designed to oppose war, but "[t]he modem rules
of jus ad helium, no less than those of jus in bello, thus effect a constructive channeling of
violence, rather than simply opposing it," citing to the work of Carl Schmitt and Thomas
Franck).
27
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however, that even the intervention of the courts in adjudicating the "terrorism" cases may simply highlight the acquiescence of the "constraint" model- the criminal justice system- in relation to the war paradigm, at its
height. 32
Even the intervention of the courts, at the height of the government's instrumentalization of the unstable border between war and crime,
largely took the form of judicial acquiescence as the courts expanded the
parameters of the war paradigm at cost to the "criminal justice" model. 33
Whence, what comes clearest from Berman's analysis of the historical and
doctrinal relationship between law and war is a strong counter-myth: the
desire invested in law as "constraint" of war almost vanishes with the attenuation of judicial review of the political decision. 34
Parallel to the contentious political debates around the status of
"enemy (non)combatants" during the last decade, there has also been a kind
of introspective political discourse on the nature and extension of American
power in the age of globalism. Much of this debate circulated around the
idea of America as a new imperial power, and questioned what this might
mean for how to conceptualize the relationship between law and war. The
buzzwords in the 1990s and the 2000s----e.g., "hegemony," "unilateralism,"
"exceptionalism"--could be considered variations on the theme of what it
meant to be the sole superpower, with the rubric of empire35 indexing a
32
Of the "unprivileged combatants," the subject of this litigation, Berman notes that:
[this]category and its attendant controversies are thus symptoms of the fact that the legal
construction of war is both indispensable and never more than provisional- that jus ad helium both must be and cannot be neutrally separated from jus in hello and that those entitled
to the rules of jus in hello both must be and cannot be defined in a way that will command
the assent of all parties to some of the most important conflicts.
Id. at 57.
33
Id. at 60 & 70 ("Examination of these cases reveals courts deeply engaged in preserving
and transforming the legal construction of war in the face of partisan efforts that seek either
to engage in an unprecedented expansion of its contours or to subject its doctrines to strategic
instrumentalization."). The only court to "block" the government's attempt to expand of the
contours of the legal construction of war is the Padilla circuit court. But see also Boumedienne and the other "terrorism" cases: whilst the Supreme Court declared the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution and declared that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to the habeas corpus writ, the
Court did not specify "whether" or "how an applicable guarantee can be enforced": see
Christina Duffy Burnett, "A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumedienne," 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009).
34
Id. at 59 (the courts take various approaches, which Berman labels "formalist," per the
sovereign declaration; "factualist," where war is defined according to "objective" criteria;
and "functionalist," where the designation of war did or did not make juridical sense. Thus,
there is a hint in all this that a more robust judicial review would have indexed "law" as
"constraint" to the strategic expansion of the war paradigm without limit).
35
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, "Unilatralism and Constiturionalism," 79 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1971,
1973 (2004), quoted in Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, International
Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morality (3rd ed.) (Ox(ord, 2007), at 54: "In other
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comparison to similar historical unipolar precedents, such as Rome or Great
Britain.

B.

Law of Empire

Before and during the time in which "lawfare" was regenerated as a
legal term of art in relation to the laws and conduct of war, the various
views on the extension of U.S. power around the globe, particularly in its
wars- the "humanitarian" wars in the 1990s and post-9111 Afghanistan and
Iraq---coalesced around the view of America as a new imperial power. 36
The closest historical analogue to the U.S. version was the British Empire,
and scholars and commentators looked closely for similarities and differences, as well as lessons learned. John Fabian Witt37 reviewed four recent
books on this topic, all centered on the question of law in relation to empire.
As Witt notes, "Old-fashioned empire is suddenly everywhere. . . Hard
power is back, and so too are a set of difficult constitutional questions:
about the Constitution and foreign affairs, about the significance of international law, and about the relationship of foreign affairs authority to domestic
rights and powers, to mention only a few." 38
Witt reduces the "law of empire" in relation to war, or the use of
force, whether British or American---or "Anglo-American"-to two formulations along ideological lines: the first submits war as external to law, the
second as internal to law. He writes:
[T]he Anglo-American law of empire has remained strikingly similar over
the past 150 years, its landmarks remarkably little changed by the winds of

words, we were bestowing on the world the gift of American law and the American way. . .
The second motivation was to increase American wealth and power ... Hence America's
internationalist crusade after 1945 was in part intended to establish throughout as much of
the world as possible, a stable legal, political and economic order in which American commerce would flow freely and American military power would reign supreme. Both these sets
of motives could be described as 'imperialist."' However, "As European integration progressed and as the Soviet fall from world power turned into utter collapse, the 'international
community' became more discontent[ ed] with American power. It came to see international
law as a vehicle for restraining the 'hyperpower,' and it became increasingly less tolerant of
American 'exceptionalism. '"
36
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRJ, EMPIRE 182 (Harv. Univ. Press) (2002) ("The U.S.
Constitution, as Jefferson said, is the one best calibrated for extensive Empire. We should
emphasize once again that this Constitution is imperial and not imperialist. It is imperial
because (in contrast to imperialism's project always to spread its power linearly in closed
spaces and invade, destroy, and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty) the U.S.
constitutional project is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unbounded terrain.").
37
See generally John Fabian Witt, Book Review: Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis
of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754
(2007).
38
Id. at 754--55.
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time. Like their nineteenth-century British predecessors, American constitutionalists now debate the allocation of foreign affairs powers between
the legislative and executive branches. They debate the extent to which
such allocations of power are susceptible to judicial review. They debate
the merits of emergency exceptions to constitutional systems. 39

However, within these debates, the claim of a unilateral executive
seemed more unique to the United States., due to differences in the constitutional cultures of the two empires. These differences led to a more polarized
ideological debate. 40 Within that context, the desire reposed in law to constrain power took on an ideological cast. 41
Witt notes, however, that imperial law was always "indeterminate
and ambiguous," with one commentator suggesting that its ambivalences
"stemmed from a deep tension in British imperial practice 'between the rule
of law and the expansion of rule. "'42 The former, properly understood,
would not be subject to ideological instrumentality, but would operate as an
ideal, or rational, opposition to war as such. Witt, following R.W. Kostal,
expresses it thus:
[T]he legal frame in nineteenth-century Britain was not so much a set of
substantive answers to the questions raised by empire as it was a forum in
which debate about empire took place. The law functioned not as a body
of rules or commands, but rather as a stock of discursive moves available
to the contending parties in the debate over empire. Law created the linguistic field on which the differing sides debated the Empire.43

Witt adds a caveat: "Yet for all their agreement, for all their shared premises, it was not always clear that the legal frame could give meaningful shape
to their arguments."44 Sometimes, indeed, "law talk"45 failed to permit the

39

Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 757 ("There is at least one critical difference between the constitutionalisms of the
twenty-first and nineteenth centuries: the culture of American foreign affairs constitutionalism is radically more polarized than the constitutionalism of the nineteenth-century British
Empire; it includes claims of unilateral executive authority, on one hand, and judicially enforceable individual constitutional rights, on the other. Its British predecessor, by contrast,
rejected both executive unilateralism and judicially enforceable constitutional rights in favor
of a model that placed virtually all questions in the hands of Parliament.").
41
See id. at 757. The political right, during the Bush years, supported the enhancement of
the unilateral executive at the expense of the judges; the political left wished for more judicial review to protect the individual liberties of the terrorism detainees.
42
id. at 767 (quoting DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND TH E
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 I 0 (Thomas
A. Green, Hendrik Hartog, & Daniel Ersnt. eds. Univ. of North Carolina Press) (2005).
43
id. at 791 . See also R.W. KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND
THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press) (2005).
44
Witt, supra note 37, at 791.
40
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means for parties to connect with each other at all, and debate over the law
of empire "began to spill over into political and ideological [arguments]."46
The clear picture that emerges from Witt's analysis of the law of
empire is of its historical contingency and its "constraint" to the imperatives
of empire/expansion. However, Witt wants to recuperate an ideal of law as
rational discourse in relation to the irrationality and violence of warnotwithstanding war as the "construct" of law. Thus, he writes that, "However muddled and messy, however indeterminate and awkward, the legal
frame's modest virtue is its historical association with relatively less repressive forms of global power." 47 Following Kostal, he notes also that, "the
persistence of the legal frame in the British Empire helped to constrain empire's excesses, even in places like [the 1865 revolt in the Jamaican town
of] Morant Bay.'..i8
This expresses law's historical contingency, but also speaks to a
popular conception of law, one that severs law "as such" from the political
process, and reposes in law the capacity to express the moral values of a
community. Indeed, the "legal imagination" represented by legal discourse
"produces a particular form of community. The choice to engage in law talk
is the choice to engage in a kind of discourse with its own internal morality-a morality that rests on reason and that entails the dignity of the individuals who make claims on it."49 Witt's emphasis, by repetition, of the
word "choice" presupposes a departure from force as the expression of instinctual desire, a suppression of the force of desire as such.
Daniel Williams, however, critiques this Rationalist or Enlightenment view of law as repository of the rational discourse of a centered self,
which Witt wishes to reclaim in the midst of the fraught and polarized contemporary debate. Again within the context of America's "imperialist" ambitions pursuant to its "war on terror," Williams posits law as coextensive
with, rather than extrinsic to, the violence of war. 50 Williams suggests that
the line is thin between law's construction of war as limited to "lex specialis," on the one hand, and on the other a rationalistic law of empire internally conflicted between the desire for unlimited expansion and the desire for
51
self-restraint. Williams locates the source of both within what he terms the

45

Id. at 783 ("The deep penetration of law talk into the debates on the Morant Bay affair
made law, in Kostal's words, the 'forum for negotiation of the basic terms of political power'
in the Jamaica debate.") (quoting R.W. KOSTAL, supra note 43, at 464).
46
Id. at 791.
47
Id. at 796.
48
Id. at 796-97.
49
Id. at 784.
50
See generally Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush- Part I: Hamdi, 9/I I, and the
Dark Side ofthe Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 341 (2007).
s1
Id.
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"dark side"52 of the Enlightenment tradition. The distinction is manifest in
the deference, in a substantive sense, of the judiciary to the political
branches in the conduct of the "war on terror."
For Williams, law is "nothing more than a facet of human striving,"
which itself is "more about desire and fantasy than it is about rationality." 53
Whence, the rationalism of law is already subject to the exigencies of desire, indeed, it is a construct of desire. 54 When, therefore, desire itself is
construed according to imperial imperatives (the "rule of expansion," in
Witt's phrase), 55 then legal constraints, such as in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
judgment,56 that required the executive to defer to Congress, are no more
than a further suppression of law (in the sense of constraint, expressed as
the authority of the judiciary over the political branches) in relation to politics. After Hamdi, the executive sought from Congress passage of the 2006
Military Commissions Act (MCA). 57 Williams describes this Act as an "expansion of sovereignty through legislative manufacturing of a rights regime
outside the established framework of the Constitution," and "a process of
legality that manufactures 'law' to suit the state's global ambitions." 58
Williams' view of law as the "legality" that characterizes and legitimates the "war on terror" is essentially unconstrained by law as "reason,"
and conforms to the "law-as-war" model, whereby even Witt's (rational)
space for legal discourse is so captured by the war paradigm that law and
war are indistinguishable. 59 Williams takes Berman's argument to an extreme: with the instauration of a war paradigm to adjudicate what might
otherwise be criminal acts (i.e., acts of terror), the "law" or justice model is
co-opted and ceases to function outside of the war framework or, put other-

Id.
Id at 344.
54
Id. ("The war against terrorism, when rhetorically decoded, is packaged as a fight
against the dark side, a fight to preserve our Enlightenment heritage by averting the onset of
a new dark age.").
55
Witt, supra note 37, at 767.
56
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
57
Kate Zemike, Senate Approves Broad New Rules to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2006, at A I.
58
Williams, supra note 50, at 351 - 52 (The "legality" in question is what he describes as
"process jurisprudence.") ("This fearsome sort of legality is largely shielded from our view
(that is, from the view of Americans-the ones wielding this legality) with the veil of democracy, knitted together with the thread of process jurisprudence.").
59
Id at 385 (discussing how "necessity" produces law) ("The birth of the War on Terror
thus came in the form of law. It is in this sense that necessity is not outside of law, or suspends law, but instead creates the conditions for a new legal regime to bloom through the
acts of the sovereign. Necessity is the soil for the seeds of law to take root. Necessity does
not exempt. It produces.").
52
53
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wise, outside of war-thought. 60 The Supreme Court's post-9/11 jurisprudence has developed merely to ratify this view. 61
Another critique of the law of empire and the metaphor of war from
James Forman62 also struggles with the parameters of law as expansion or as
constraint, and like Williams, comes to settle upon the view that "law is
war" under the hegemony of the Bush doctrine and the judicial acquiescence therein. Forman's view is from the perspective of domestic law, rather than from the view of international law. Like Witt, Forman writes from
the internal perspective of law's Enlightenment promise as vehicle of rationality and repository of equality and justice. But like Williams, Forman
seems less sanguine than Witt about the potential for law to live up to this
promise. Rather than the popular conception of the war on terror as exceptional, as a "sharp break from the past, with American values and ideals
'betrayed,' American law 'remade,"' the truth "is more complicated." 63 Instead, Forman argues, "the war on terror is an extension- sometimes a grotesque one--ofwbat we do in the name of the war on crime."64
Forman's article is devoted to charting the various strategies and attitudes, particularly one of complacency, of an American public toward the
most punitive aspects of the domestic "war on crime." In essence, "We have
come to accept. .. excesses as casualties of war-whether on crime, drugs,
or terror." 65 And these excesses, which have become normative domestically, are exported as unexceptionable in the war on terror.
Furthermore, Forman cautions that to conceive of domestic law as
the bearer of virtue, as the norm in relation to an "aberrant" legal system in
Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, is to elide the extent to which the latter is
in fact the norm within domestic law. 66 "It lets some people-We the
60

Williams, supra note 50 (following Giorgio Agamben in arguing that the war paradigm
is a "state of exception" that "suspends" the criminal process and creates an alternative "legality," a "law of detention" at the behest of the sovereign) ("[O}ur so-called war on terror is
'transformed into a reality indefinitely extended into the future, control1ing not only the lives
of prisoners and the fate of constitutional and international law, but also the very ways in
which the future may or may not be thought" (quoting Jumrn BUTLER, PRECARJOUS LIFE:
THE POWER OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE 54 (Verso) (2004)).
61
Id.
62
See generally James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped
Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE331 (2009).
63
Id. at 332.
64
Id. at 332- 33.
65
Id. at 333.
66
Id. at 337- 38 ("America suffers no lack of enthusiasm for the greatness of its legal
system. Instead, our failure is to see our flaws. Convinced that our system is the most rightsprotective in the world, we are insufficiently self-reflective. For the same reasons, we are
often highly suspicious of comparative or international reform models. These tendencies
have stunted the development of our criminal justice system. Worse, they have left us in the
unenviable position of having one of the most punitive systems in the world while believing
we have one of the most liberal." And further on, Williams notes: "My discomfort comes
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People--off the hook." 67 As such, Forman's aim is in "exploring continuities in places where the prevailing wisdom has been to emphasize discontinuity. I [Forman] want to understand why we as a nation have allowed certain things to go on in our name, even, in some cases, after we learned the
truth about abuses in the war on terror." 68
In short, Forman's argument is that an increasingly normative approach to criminal justice as harsh has formed the backdrop to "America's
punitive approach to fighting the war on terror." 69 The law's role in this is
central, one key element being to limit the role of the judiciary in relation to
the political branches.70 Another is to undermine the role of defense counsel
in the war on terror. He writes: "Lawyers representing those locked up in
the war on terror have been accused of waging 'lawfare': 'the growing use
of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool
of war .. . to gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world
opinion. "'71
"Lawfare" is used here in the sense of a continuity between war and
law, whereby "law" is fully captured by war. Jettisoned is the idea of law as
the repository of value, reason, or truth. That is, lawfare is a distortion of
law itself within the "metaphor"72 of war and its aims. Implicit here, as in
Williams, is the "promise" of law as more than its punitive manifestation
within the war paradigm. Implicit is the desire for law to function as a constraint upon power. As such, Forman's critique of the law as merely instrumental to war is basically reformist: the only way to change the operation of
law-as-war is to fully apprehend and appreciate law's reduction at home to
an instrument wielded, not by an overreaching executive, but by the public
at large in its acceptance of- and sometimes its call for-a law of crime
model that posits the war "metaphor" as paradigmatic of justice.
Ultimately, Forman's call, like Williams' and Witt's, is for a return
of law to a lost, prelapsarian state of grace, when law was inclusive (Witt's
from the fact that in contrasting the aberrant (Guantanamo) with the normal (our domestic
criminal justice system) we become blinded to the profound abnormality of our domestic
criminal system. One of my goals in this Article is to counter this tendency by raising questions about our domestic criminal system by turning a mirror back on it.").
67
Id. at 338.
68
Id. at 339-40.
69
Id. at 347.
70
Id. at 361 ("As these examples make clear, in the war on crime the legislative and executive branches moved jointly to expand their own authority at the expense of the judiciary."); See also Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109- 366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
71
Id. at 363 (quoting David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2007, at Al I).
72
Id. at 373 (''Throughout this article, I have attempted to show how, in some important
ways, 9/l I did not change everything.. . There is one final analogy that is worth our consideration, one which might help explain all the others. It concerns th.every metaphor of war.").
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191h century metropolitan "law talk"); when law was rational (Williams on
the call to law's Enlightenment heritage); when law was just (Forman's call
to a robust judiciary constraining the worst instincts of a populace enervated
by its "war on crime"). In each case, law represents a rationalist desire for
self-restraint in tension with the drive toward untrammeled and expansive
power.
Each of these critiques of the law of empire, and the war model it
appears to project, implicates a sense of law as broader than the war paradigm and the law's constitutive function. But the breadth is confined to the
parameters of law discourse sensu stricto: law's promise, law's justice, even
law's grace. In an almost theological tum, the discourse on law and war
seems to follow from an originary and traumatic loss. But what lies behind
these laments is an even more complicated elision: of law as always and
already incomplete, contingent, impure. These authors therefore index how
much the law of empire depends upon a binarity, which in tum constrains
the juridical category, or juridical thought, in its capacity to think relationally, or to think in other than juridically bounded terms (law is a "contained
entity," in the positivist sense). 73 As such, within the paradigm of war, law
moves from contingency to formality.
I shall return to the theme of "relational'' thought in Part IV of this
Article. Here, however, in this brief review of what is a broad and multifaceted debate, I have suggested that these historically situated views reduce
to two potential roles for law: either as part of the war mechanism or "discourse," or as separate from it. The perspective that comes through is of a
very limited role for law, on the one hand, in light of the expanded political
authority to extend American power globally (through its wars), and on the
other, an expansive instrumentality of law (or "legality") to justify those
political and ideological ambitions. In the result, law "as" war, as well as
law "and" war, represent conflicting desires-and different forms of expressing them-on a continuum within the imperial war imaginary. The
discursive opposition is between law as positing the desire for self-restraint,
and law as legitimating the desire for expansion (the law-as-war model).
In the following analysis, I wish to explore the implications of
thinking about lawfare as expressive of this bounded view of law inherent to
the above critical perspectives that circulated around the time of lawfare's
coinage, as well as expressive of a relational view beyond its historical
sources. As noted, Dunlap's conception of lawfare enters the frame as both
an instance of the instrumentalization of the unstable border between war

73

See, e.g., Mirza, supra, note 9, at 618 ("The law is not a contained entity, as described
in positivist accounts, but is in a condition of 'perpetual hyphenation,' as indicated by Foucault's coinage of terms: 'politico-juridical,' 'epistemologico-juridical,' 'scientifico-legal,'
and 'juridico-anthropological. "').
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and not war. 74 I examine Dunlap's 2001 essay on lawfare, coming as it does
directly in the wake of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. 75 I then look at
Dunlap's 2009 "refined"76 definition. It is in the latter that a more relational
critique of law comes to view, not through the specific definitional criteria
Dunlap outlines, but within the textual figures and rhetorical significations.
I suggest, then, that lawfare, as a border concept, looks backwards to law as
a "contained entity," i.e., law's ineluctable nexus with war as tending toa relational concept, sensiward a "war paradigm," and forwards to law
tive to "influences from things which are other to it, and ever-absorbing
these in its 'vacuity. ,,,n

as

III. LA WFARE AS BORDER CONCEPT: EVOLVING MEANINGS AND
SIGNIFICATIONS

In this Part, I will chart Dunlap's changes in the definition of "lawfare" between 2001 and 2009. I suggest that in the first definition, "lawfare"
seems to represent not only the "bounded" view of law, but the law's radical
delimitation to purely formal instrument of the military aims contemporary
with the term's inauguration. In Dunlap's later definition, the term opens
itself up to an alternative, more contingent perspective, which in tum intimates an extrajuridical critique of law within the confines of the law of empire as the law of war.

A.

Law/are in 2001

Dunlap delineates law, in relation to lawfare, according to three criteria of analysis: as adherence, as strategy, and as valuation. In each, Dunlap's earlier definition of "lawfare" is essentially in the negative, a caution
against the limitative or constraining influence of law in war. Dunlap is critical of those commentators who call for more, rather than less, law. He argues that adherence, particularly to the international laws of war, could limit
the military in its attempt to achieve its aims. 78 Embedded in his formulation
of lawfare is the view that law bears society's values and aspirations. As
such, in times of crisis, the "value" in security and survival trump any rights
and liberties a society might value under a "different" model of law. Dunlap
fully embraces the war paradigm, and "lawfare" represents that embrace.
Dunlap begins his article with the following questions:
Is lawfare turning warfare into unfair? In other words, is international law
undercutting the ability of the U.S. to conduct effective military interven74
75
76

77
78

Dunlap, supra note I, at 60 & 70.
Id
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35.
Mirza, supra note 9, at 618.
See Dunlap, supra note 1.
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tions? ls it becoming a vehicle to exploit American values in ways that actually increase risks to civilians? In short, is law becoming more of the
79
problem in modern war instead of part of the solution?

A central concern is with adherence to law to the extent that it does
not interfere with the war aims. These aims are furthered by new, technological methods of warfare- particularly aerial war methods. Dunlap cautions
against adherence to the laws of war, or the "laws of armed conflict"
80
(LOAC), when these conflict with the U.S.'s war aims.
This theme is carried through in Dunlap's discussion of international law as such. Pursuant to the theme of law as repository of value, he notes
that LOAC necessarily expresses an abstract, universal value that may be
unconnected to the values of a specific culture or national entity. 81 He underlines this point by noting how much closer LOAC is to European values
than it is to American ones: a case in point is the different valuation Europeans place in their armed forces compared with Americans' attitude toward
the same. 82 Thus, both as bearer of value and as limited to furthering the
war's aims, lawfare reduces law to the legitimation of war aims: law "as"
war.
A second salient emphasis in the article is the definition of "lawfare" to reference the strategy of the enemy. Hence, "lawfare" "describes a
method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective. " 83 In the hands of the enemy, this means that, "Though at first blush
one might assume lawfare would result in less suffering in war (and sometimes it does), in practice it too often produces behaviors that jeopardize the
protection of the truly innocent. " 84 This is because lawfare, as a weapon of
war, is designed to "make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation
of the letter or spirit of LOAC." 85 As noted above, Dunlap defends the
79

Id. at 1.
See id. at 15 ("When interpretations of LOAC look as if they are disconnected to humanitarian values, support for the law inevitably wanes.").
81
Id. at 17 (discussing universal versus particular values).
82
Id. ("Despite the existence of an all-volunteer force, Americans in and out of uniform
generally do not consider those who serve as anything other than citizens of equal or more
value as any enemy combatant or noncombatant. Europeans, however, have a history of
populating heir militaries with long-term professionals and legions of hired foreigners. This
seems to create a certain sense that the armed forces are more tools of the state than citizenry
in uniform. To me, this produces a collective societal ethic that gives the impression that
military personnel are expendable assets." Dunlap makes the point that because of these
differences, LOAC does not represent "universal" values.).
83
Id. at 4.
84
Id.
85
Id. (noting that lawfare is described as "increasingly foes of the United States see this
development [i.e. the instant news cycle and imagery overwhelming a government's capacity
to explain itself] as a vulnerability to be exploited. No longer able to seriously confront- let
80
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commander's non-adherence to LOAC to the extent that international law
does not conform to U.S. values. In the result, "lawfare" indexes a highly
skeptical attitude between law and war, one that reduces the former to the
latter.
The instrumental emphasis of law is furthered in Dunlap's definition of "lawfare" as a "technique"86 deployed by the United States and her
allies. Lawfare lends moral and legal "cover" to the commander in the
field. 87 Thus, to diminish the effectiveness of lawfare strategies of the enemy, Dunlap proposes a form of law as pervasive but seamless with the war
aim. Citing to the U.S.'s obligation, pursuant to Operation Enduring Freedom, to "engage in extensive negotiations and diplomatic strategies to obtain legal rights for the basing and overflight of military aircraft" and the
resulting "threat that lawfare will make obtaining like commitments even
more troublesome in the future," Dunlap proposes more "permanent solutions" to the problem of lawfare. 88 "In my view one of these could be a
greater militarization-indeed weaponization--of space."89
Dunlap's development of lawfare cautions against adherence to law
if this should ''judicialize" the war effort. 90 In the wake of 9/11, popular
sentiment seemed to support a robust executive with virtually unlimited
powers. 91 Compliance with the rule of law, at this early stage in what was

alone defeat- America militarily, they resort to a strategy that can be labeled 'lawfare'.")
(italics in original).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 6 ("Michael lgnatieff, who has written extensively about the role of law and lawyers in the Balkan conflict, provides real insight into the thinking of many senior officials.
He maintains: '[Lawyers] provide harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal
coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality, so that whatever moral or operational doubts a commander may have, he can at least be sure he will not
face legal consequences.' In short, the predominance of law and lawyers in U.S. military
interventions is as much a concession to the verities of modem war as it is an altruistic commitment to human rights," (citing to MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR (Metropolitan
· Books 2000) at 199.).
88
Id. at 16.
89
Id ("Among other things, orbiting armed space systems would obviate the need for
foreign basing or overflight permissions. This would provide the U.S. with greater flexibility
for unilateral military intervention if required. Of course, the weaponization of space will
produce a host of legal and policy issues.").
90
Id. at 19.
91
Id. at 18 ("Americans are much more concerned about finding and stopping the perpetrators of violence than they are about the niceties of international law . .. Stewart Baker, the
former general counsel of the National Security Agency, concludes '[w]e have judicialized
more aspects of human behavior than any civilization in history, and we may have come to
the limit of that.' Consequently, in security matters contemporary American discourse is
pervaded by the notion that '[t]he time for legal maneuverings, extraditions and trials is
past."' (citing Charles Krauthamrner, To War, Not Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at 29
("An open act of war demands a military response, not a judicial one") and John Lancaster
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named a "war on terror," was to be purely strategic. For instance, if the
enemy is using legal means in an asymmetrical war, how can we fight back?
The answer was: adherence to LOAC to the extent that it reflects "our" values, and to the extent that it pragmatically supports the aims of war, as interpreted by the political branch. 92 Dunlap expresses support for the "vastly
greater powers" arrogated to the executive by the legislature "at the expense
of what heretofore were accepted individual rights." 93
A couple of observations can be made concerning the development
of lawfare. Unlike Forman and the other critics of the "law of empire" as
being continuous with the war paradigm, Dunlap embraces this continuity,
"law as war," as necessary in a time of war. Law must not only be reduced
to its formal element but, even then, be dispensed with if it does not serve
the aim of the commander: "[T]his paper is intended as a reminder that
those interested in promoting law as an ameliorator of the misery of war are
obliged to ensure it does not become bogged down with interpretations that
are at odds with legitimate military concems."94 Whence, "LOAC must remain receptive to new developments, especially technological ones that can
save lives-even if that means breaking old paradigrns." 95 The paradigm in
question is the already-attenuated delimitation of law in relation to imperial
power and its wars of expansion.
The 2001 essay that inaugurated the term "lawfare" was thus not
only on all fours with the Bush Doctrine96-and, as commentators subsequently noted, was widely adopted by officials within the administration.97
It also seemed to insist upon a moral element to the reduction of law to militarized instrument, albeit within the context of "war," which itself depended
upon a successful instrumentalization of the destabilized border between
war and not war. It is this element, this valuative "center of gravity," as
Dunlap characterizes it in the subsequent essay, 98 which indexes an interestand Susan Schmidt, US Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2001, at 9.)).
92
Id. at 19.
93
Id. at 18.
94
Id. at 20.
95 Id.
96
For a discussion on The Bush Doctrine, see Charlie Gibson's Gaffe, THE WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/
09/12/AR200809 I 202457 .html/.
97
See, e.g., David Luban, Law/are and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1981, 2021 (2008) ("Jack Goldsmith's recent memoir of his service in the Bush administration confirms that the administration accepts the lawfare theory."); See also, Major General
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. & Major Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and Professional
Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. L . REV. 417
(2008); see also, Michael P . Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 321 (2009).
98
See Dunlap, supra note I.
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ing albeit counterintuitive dimension to lawfare as border concept. The radical reduction of law to pure strategic valuation registers law's inherent vacuity. As such, lawfare exposes its conception of law to an extra-legal "critique," so to speak. For the practical consequences of lawfare as weapon/strategy of war and as strategic adherence (instrumentalization) to the
laws of war have one consequence: the demolishment of value, i.e., the devaluation of the other as value.
In this early essay, Dunlap defines "lawfare" as a "legal" strategy to
stabilize one paradigm (war) at the expense of another. 99 The latter, if anything, is cast as a source of weakness and vulnerability. In the result, the
first essay presents an interpretation of lawfare specific to its historical context in two senses. First, it captures the moment of widespread disaffection
with law. The failure of international law to "save" us from 9/11 led to a
sense of impatience with international law and multilateralism, whereupon
the decisive, unilateral, even "imperial" action, captured by the rubric of
war, became attractive and resurgent. Lawfare expresses, indeed ratifies,
that sense, suggesting the pure instrumentality and subservience of law to
war.
As a consequence, lawfare's meaning and signification suppress
elements of the wider and ongoing debate and historical critique around the
manifestation of American power in a unipolar world: for example, the
fraught relationship between law and the wars of the new empire. In the
second sense, "lawfare" intimates, albeit by negation, the law as bearer of
value, humanitarian and otherwise; it invokes the "law-and-war" model of
constraint, but only as an alternative to be rejected. In this second signification, law bears "value," but this value inheres in the aims of war itselfpursuant to the war paradigm.
In Dunlap's subsequent definition of "lawfare" in 2009, he continues the three elements or significations of the term: adherence, strategy, and
valuation. ' 00 But the temporal distance from the events of 9/11 have engendered some "refinements" in the meaning of "lawfare." 101 As I will argue in
the following section, although the meaning remains "bounded," its rhetorical figuration is more contingent. This indexes the competing societal desires reposed within the law as it relates to war, and lawfare is opened up to
an alternative critique.

B.

Lawfare in 2009

In 2009, Dunlap updated his definition of the term "lawfare" in part
to respond to comments and critiques after the first article received wide
99

100
101

Id.
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35.
Id. at 35.
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circulation and attention. As noted in the previous section, his earlier definition went as follows: "[Lawfare is] the use of law as a weapon of war" and,
more specifically, "a method of warfare where law is used as a means of
realizing a military objective." 102 Today, he writes in the new article, "[T]he
most refined definition [of "lawfare"] is 'the strategy of using--or misusing-law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an opera. 1ob'~ective.
. ,,,103
t1ona
Dunlap seems to be concerned with the transformative, i.e., valuative, aspects of war and of law in his formulation of lawfare. He asks:
"While recognizing the ever-present ethical responsibility to comply with
the law, how does transforming adherence to law into a strategy serve the
purposes of the warfighter?" 104 His answer: we should have more, rather
than less, "lawfare." 105 Hence, lawfare represents in the first instance this
desire to transform adherence to law into law as a military strategy as such.
Citing to Victor Davis Hanson, Dunlap notes that "the basis for the enormous success of Western militaries is their adherence to constitutional government and respect for individual freedoms, and constant external audit
and oversight of their strategy and tactics .. . In short, adherence to the rule
of law does not present the military disadvantage so many assume." 106
Dunlap invokes von Clausewitz 107 at three points within the text.
The first instance recalls von Clausewitz's well-known definition of war
and relates it to lawfare: "Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a 'continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means' relates directly
to the theoretical basis of lawfare. "' 108 This allows Dunlap to emphasize the
importance of the apparent or "perceptual" adherence to law. The second
mention of von Clausewitz comes shortly after the first, in a quotation from
William Eckhardt as follows:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal
and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of

102

Dunlap, supra note I, at 2.
The earlier definition is cited to: Dunlap, Law/are Today, YALE J. lNT'L AFF. ·(Winter
2008), at 146.
l!l4
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35.
105
Id. at 35- 37 ("media events" to achieve military aims (Abu Ghraib, the detainee abuse
case, is a primary vehicle for the launching of a thousand "lawfare campaign[s]"; legal
process, such as contracts, lawsuits, and the "use [of] courts"; international "sanctions and
other legal methodologies," at 35; and "operational verification").
106
Id. at 37.
107
Carl von Clausewitz was an I 81h Century Gennan military theorist who stressed moral
and political aspects of war.
!OS Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35 (citing CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard
and Peter Pare!, eds. and trans., Princeton University Press, 1989)).
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war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our "center of gravity. 109

The third mention of von Clausewitz comes further on in the text. In
a discussion of the Palestine-Israel conflict as reported in a German paper,
Dunlap writes: "Interestingly, Der Spiegel characterized the expected legal
action in what are in effect lawfare terms in paraphrased Clausewitzian language as a 'continuation of the war with legal means."' 110
All these, of course, speak to the use of, and adherence to, law as
instrumental to war: as weapon, strategy, and substitution. But the conception of law as a "center of gravity" is interesting for what it harbors, implies,
and irradiates. At the end of the article, Dunlap writes:
While it is true, as Professor Eckhardt maintains, that adherence to the rule
of law is a "center of gravity" for democratic societies such as ours- and
certainly there are those who will try to turn that virtue into a vulnerability- we still can never forget that it is also a vital source of our great
. 111
strength as a nation.
The image of law as a center of gravity is both spatial-suggesting
a c·entripetal pull of law- and temporal, referring to the mores and values of
the society as a whole. It can be compared with other spatio-temporal images within the text, specifically the law and the war as separate "spaces"
that must be overlaid and infused together, ensuring the sublimation of the
individual will to the command of the general. The pull of the center (law)
ensures that the command is a representation of "our values," the source of
"our great strength." Thus, when the space of war becomes a "law-space,"
as in the following, something more than the instrumentality of law to war
seems to be at stake. Quoting Richard Schragger, Dunlap writes: "'Law
makes just wars possible by creating a well-defined legal space within
which individual soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal
moral codes. "' 112
Dunlap elaborates on the space metaphor, suggesting a (centrifugal)
spread of law from a "center" to the further reaches of the war front: "[T]he
commander [must] be concerned with legal preparation of the battles109

Id. at 35 (citing William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws
His Sword, 4 CHI. J. OF lNT'L L. 431 (2003)).
110
Id. at 37 (citing Thomas Darnstadt & Christopher Schult, Did Israel Commit War
Crimes in Gaza?, DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/
world/O, 1518,603508,00.html).
111
Id at 39 (citing William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws
His Sword, 4 CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 431 (2003).).
112
Id. at 38 (citing Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference between the President's Lawyers and the Military's, SLATE.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2150050/?nav/navoa).
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pace." 113 This assures the troops of "the legal and moral validity of their
actions," Dunlap adds. 114 Note here the transformative power with which
Dunlap invests the law: from adherence as such to adherence as strategy,
implicating a perceptual immanence of war within and through law. The
collapse between law-space and war-space is characterized as an aesthetic
project.
In the result, all three modalities of law in relation to war pursuant
to the meaning and function of lawfare-law as component (weapon) of
war; law as adherence by the subject to the colllll)and; and law as a spatiotemporal investment of the war-space with (moral) value-tend toward an
formalization of law in relation to war. Whence, the more formalistic and
aesthetic the category of law-as representing the value and legitimacy of
power-the more persuasive would be adherence to law, and the deployment of law as military strategy, to justify the (military) exercise of power.
But while this latter definition remains embedded within the war
paradigm that defined the earlier meaning of "lawfare" (law is instrumental
to war), it subtly, and by indirection, intimates the desire for law to project
an alternative matrix, one of juridical constraint. It does this, paradoxically,
by defining lawfare as the delegitimation of the "value" of the other. Thus,
if in the first instance lawfare delegitimizes "value" as such, then in theory
it critiques the command as a purely political act not subject to the law's
review. That is, if law under the war paradigm has fully incorporated the
aims of war and the voice of the commander as the vehicle of "my" value
and "my" virtue, then lawfare implicitly critiques this-and thereby the war
paradigm within which this view is inscribed-through its apophatic 115 conceptualization of law as an instrument of de-valuation, or negation, as such.
This, at least, is the theory, i.e., that lawfare by a kind of negative
imaging of law as value represents an alternative to the determinate view of
law in relation to war. What is proposed here is not that Dunlap sets out to
claim a distinction from the "necessity" of law's suppression within warDunlap makes a much clearer statement along those lines in the first definition. Rather, an analysis of the rhetoric within which he "refines" his definition suggests that law, reduced to an aesthetic - or, in theological terms, an
apophatic----category, registers its central valuative vacuity. As the critiques
in the previous section (Part II) indicated, this delivers law to strategic instrumentalization by all parties for their own advantage. Lawfare is one
such instance, deploying law as a weapon of war and an "instrument" of
strategic adherence. But it also intimates an interruption to what seems an
113

Id. at37.
Id. at 38.
115
Apophasis is a theological term, generally meaning a knowledge of God through negation (literally, an ''un-saying"). THE NEW WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN
SPIRITUALITY 117 (Philip Sheldrake ed., 2005).
114
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inevitable construction of war by law. By implication, lawfare interferes
with the desire for unlimited expansion characteristic of the law of empire
in its transcription as the law of war (war paradigm). In short, the aestheticization of law by war, so to speak, confirms the conception of lawfare as
border concept and, thereby, the potential for relation beyond the bounded
and fixed confines of law and/as war.
What, however, does a "relational" concept of law involve, particularly as this would seem to implicate an "outside" of law? Is there such a
domain? In the final section, Part IV, I entertain a thought experiment, whereby lawfare as a border concept is analogous to various threshold concepts
in other domains, 116 such as theology and psychoanalysis. 117 In this way, I
hope to show what lawfare, as a concept situated between law and war, as
well as located outside of the discourse at the same time, might provoke in
thinking about the parameters of the law/war matrix. I suggest such an experiment is already implied by lawfare as linguistic desire in relation to the
new phase of the old wars that gave birth to the term, and in relation to other
wars and occupations that the term might reference in the future.
IV. LA WF ARE AS PASSAGE CONCEPT (A BRIEF PSYCHOANALYTIC
INTERPELLATrON)

Under the law-as-war paradigm, lawfare extends and enhances
war's juridical and moral legitimacy as such through the use of law to extend or contract the boundary between war and not-war. Likewise, the instauration of war-value as a "center of gravity" to lawfare-<leployment of
law within, and as, war--extends or contracts the boundary between law
and not-law. Both discursive movements, i.e., extensions and contractions,
inhere in a determinate, or bounded, view of the interrelationship and enmeshment between law and war. That is, law/war is, or is not, X, at a fixed
point along a continuum, the border between them moving, like a chess
piece, according to the success or failure of a strategic (and partisan) legal
argument or military campaign.
116
Domains not discussed in this article might include, for example, sociology and anthropology. See, e.g., Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod, Why We Talk to Ter.rorists, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2010 (The authors counter the legal presumption, per the recent U.S. Supreme Court
holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010), that "any 'material
support' of a foreign terrorist group, including talking to terrorists or the communication of
expert knowledge and scientific information, helps lend 'legitimacy' to the organization."
The authors suggest that whilst this must sometimes be true, "American law has to find a
way to make a clear distinction between illegal material support and legal actions that involve talking with terrorists privately in the hopes of reducing global terrorism and promoting national security." The authors are from anthropology and political science, respectively).
117
But see, e.g., Susan R. Schmeiser, Romancing the Family: Tribute to Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 327, 336 (2010) (cautioning against "the quest for a
more exalted discipline for the study of law").
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In a sense, Dunlap's project, i.e., "lawfare," suggests the extension
of the war paradigm through the dilation, rather than the contraction, of the
use of law, both in response to the enemy's lawfare campaigns (attempts to
delegitimize the U.S.'s war aims and conduct), and as an expansion and
legitimation of the war aims as such. The question then becomes whether
lawfare can be conceptualized to effectuate an opposite strategy, thought, or
result. I have argued that an analysis of Dunlap's meaning and the significations of the term lawfare would suggest that yes: lawfare, unlike the traditional law/war topology from which as language it derives, indexes something beyond the confmes of that bounded discourse. I turn briefly, and by
way of conclusion, to psychoanalysis, in an attempt to excavate that extradiscursive and relational sense projected by the term "lawfare."
Previously, I suggested that lawfare as a border concept enabled a
view of its tertiary intimation, beyond "law" and "war" as a fixed, dyadic
fatality. The metaphor I would suggest further, however, might be of lawfare as a passage. This gets to the sense of its projection beyond merely intimating a "third way," and highlights its potential as an escape or terminus,
a result different from the war paradigm to which law is captive--or, put
otherwise, the law paradigm through which war is constitutive. It is as passage that lawfare might borrow by analogy from the insights of psychoanalysis.
The irony, or paradox, is that the move from a bounded sense oflaw
to a relational conception actually limits what law is. The bounded conception, with its signification of law at fixed points along a continuum, is characteristic of the expansive war paradigm as, according to Witt, the law of
empire. 118 A relational jurisprudence, as suggested by a radical reading of
law through the lens of theology or psychoanalysis, has already limited itself by "relating" to, i.e., by requiring the appearance of, the other.
A relational theory does not deny the violence of law. 119 To the contrary, relationality accepts, as Gillian Rose puts it, that both self and other
are "equally enraged and invested" in the moment of law's mediation of

118
See also, HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 36, at 12 (by way of analogy, on war and empire,
stating that "[t]he traditional concept of just war involves the banalization of war and the
celebration of it as an ethical instrument, both of which were ideas that modem political
thought and the international conununity of nation-states had resolutely refused. These two
traditional characteristics have reappeared in our postmodern world: on the one hand, war is
reduced to the status of police action, and on the other, the new power that can legitimately
exercise ethical functions through war is sacralized.").
119
See, e.g., SLAVOJ ZIZEK, VIOLENCE: Six SIDEWAYS REFLECTIONS 195 n.17 (Profile
Books 2008) (referencing the German word gewa/t, meaning both 'authority' or 'established
power;' and the English phrase 'to enforce the law,' "which suggests that it is impossible to
think about the law without referring to a certain violence, both at the origin, when the law is
first created, and repeatedly, when the law is 'applied'").
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desire. 120 The difference, then, between a determinate view and a relational
view is one of recognition. We see law in relation to war more objectively,
as a productive instrument, and so we can think law otherwise.
Kathryn Tanner, a theologian, expresses a similar problem within
Christian thought. Tanner notes that in traditional theology, "[H]uman consciousness is the image of God all by itself, in an ideally self-enclosed selfsufficiency-e.g., when the self is knowing, loving, or remembering only its
own pure productions." Tanner then writes: "The alternative would be to
consider human nature an essentially relational affair, indistinct apart from
and clearly definable only in terms of its determination by what it is related
to. Human beings would therefore become the image of God only in an actual relationship with God, bringing with it the only real correspondence
with divine life and action to be found in human existence." 121
Relational theory suggests an essential malleability of thought. In
theology, this is apposite to an uncertainty of how one comes to "know"
God, as expressed within the apophatic tradition. 122 If humans are made in
His image, then the production of a self through the recognition of self as
image of an incomprehensible other is already both a saying and an unsaying, an in-determination of the self in relation to knowing the unknowable.
But this comes about through relation, rather than solipsism. 123 Tanner suggests this in the following terms: "[Humans] are the mirror of whatever it is
upon which they gaze. They take their identities from the uses to which they

°
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Kathryn Tanner, In the Image of the Invisible, in APOPHATIC BODIES: NEGATIVE
THEOLOGY, INCARNATION, AND RELAT!ONALITY 119 (Chris Boesel & Catherine Keller eds.,
2010).
121
Id. at 119.
122
See, e.g., Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Dionysius, Derrida, and the Critique of "Ontotheo/ogy," 24:4 MODERN THEOLOGY 725, 731 (Oct. 2008) (comparing apophaticism to deconstruction.). Although ultimately different, Rubenstein notes that central to both, and different then
from the "kataphatic" tradition implied within ontotheology, is "the Dionysian God [as]
triune [in a hierarchical sense]; that is, self-identical only by means of differentiation and
relation." Furthermore, apropos of relationality, Dionysius' God "refuses to stand still like a
good metaphysical lodestone; in fact, it defies the logic of rest and motion, intemality and
externality. This is the reason the soul must abandon itself as a knowing self before it can be
lifted to union with God." Id. at 728. The juxtaposition, then, is between relation as movement, and certainty as stasis, whereupon the apophatic God "refuses to be conceptualized.
Rather than securing knowledge, he disables it; rather than affirming human subjectivity, he
dismantles it." Id. at 731.
123
See, e.g., Veronique Voruz, 'That which in life might prefer death .... ': From the
death drive to the desire of the analyst, in LAW AND EVIL: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS,
PSYCHOANALYSIS 273 (Ari Hirvonen & Janne Porttikivi eds., 2010). For Kant-as described
by Jacques-Alain Miller- "the subject is speaking to himself, enunciating a law that terrorizes him." Id. Lacan looks to Sade for an explicit "distinction between subject and other." Id.
In short, "(t]he Kantian subject may be free from objective causality, the scientific determinism, but Lacan demonstrates that it is not free from the object-cause of the moral law that it
gives itself." Id.
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put themselves, like vessels that gain their character from whatever they are
made to carry." 124
As previously noted, "lawfare" signifies law as a central valuative
emptiness, a "center of gravity" as sheer strategy (law deployed as strategic
adherence, as weapon, and as devaluation). 125 Although this conception
endorses the war paradigm, it also functions as the basis of critique, since it
is here that a methodology of relation might be articulated. Thus, the proposal is for a theory of intersubjective exchange 126 a process of subjectivation that takes account of situated experience. In the context of psychoanalysis, this involves the temporal and contingent "dialogue" between the analyst and the analysand at the level of desire-although not desire for each
other. Lawfare as passage might, by analogy, involve a similar iteration at
the level of valuation, with law as the medium of exchange.
Veronique Voruz describes Jacques Lacan's development of an ethics of the psychoanalytic practice. 127 Voruz notes that for psychoanalysis to
work, it must be conceived as potentially coming to an end, i.e., it must be
"terminable." 128 For this to occur, the analyst must substitute and "incarnate" the object-cause of the analysand's (patient's) desire with the "experienced"129 or analyzed desire of the analyst. This process of incarnation,
124

Tanner, supra note 120, at 123- 24. Tanner adds that,"'[h]uman nature adapts itself to
the direction of thought and it changes according to whatever form it is inclined to by the
impulse of free choice.' This means .. . that '[h]uman nature is in fact like a mirror, and it
takes on different appearances according to the impressions of free will.' . . . Reflective
capacities of self-judgment mean humans can try to reshape in a self-critical fashion even
those desires they cannot help having by nature." Id. at 124 (quoting Gregory of Nyssa,
Fourth Homily, in COMMENTARY ON THE SONG OF SONGS at 92 (Casimir McCambley trans.
..
and intro., 1987)).
125
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35.
126
See, e.g., Grant Kester, Work.shop Notes from the Monongahela Conference on Postindustrial Community Development, Carnegie Mellon University (Oct. 23- 25, 2003),
http://moncon.greenmuseum.org/papers/kester.pdf (last visited August 28, 2010) (opposing
the hermeneutic tradition's "arid proceduralism that exiles the physical, somatic, and nonverbal components of collaboration" with "the vulnerability of intersubjective exchange" as
the basis for a concrete "dialogic interaction," within the context (for Kessler) of the collaboration between artist and co-participants within collaborative projects).
127
See Voruz, supra note 123.
128
Voruz, supra note 123, at 275. After reduction of multiple to "fundamental" fantasy,
"The analyst can then incarnate the object-cause of the analysand's desire, a desire which
like all desires is stmctura/Jy perverse, and so expose the jouissance of the analysand: by
incarnating the object-cause of the analysand's desire, and not of his or her fantasy, the analyst incarnates castration in order to separate the analysand from his or her deleterious, mortifying jouissance. (Castration of course is to be understood as a limit to jouissance.)" (italics
in original) (internal citations omitted). Id.
129
THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK VII, THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, 19591960 300 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Dennis Porter trans., Routledge, 1992) in Id. at 260. The
full quotation from Lacan comes at the beginning ofVoruz' essay as an epigraph: "What the
analyst has to give, unlike the partner in the act of love, is something that even the most
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with theological echoes (i.e., the body of Christ), creates the condition for
the "castration" 130 or limitation of the analysand's "jouissance." 131 The lan132
guage is technical, but it points to a basic problem of how the analysand
is to live with her "symptom," the thing about her that makes her who she
is, that shows itself repeatedly as marking her as "this" rather than "that"
person. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, "A person's symptom is his or her
true identity." He continues: "Lacan said that the symptom of certain persons could be the most real thing they possess. This illuminates for us how
the symptom is associated with the real." 133

beautiful bride in the world cannot outmatch, that is, to say, what he has. And what he has is
nothing other than his desire, like that of the analysand, with the difference that it is an experienced desire." Id.
130
Voruz, supra note 123, at 275 . After reduction of multiple to "fundamental" fantasy,
"The analyst can then incarnate the object-cause of the analysand's desire, a desire which
like all desires is structurally perverse, and so expose the jouissance of the analysand: by
incarnating the object-cause of the analysand's desire, and not of his or her fantasy, the analyst' incarnates castration in order to separate the analysand from his or her deleterious, mortifying jouissance. (Castration of course is to be understood as a limit to jouissance.)" (italics
in original) (internal citations omitted). Id.
IJI
See, e.g., Jacqueline Rose, Introduction- II, in JACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY:
JACQUES LACAN AND THE ECOLE FREUDIENNE 34 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds.,
Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985) ("For Freud . . . all instincts are characterized by their aggression, their tenacity or insistence (exactly their drive). It is this very insistence which places
the drive outside any register of need, and beyond any economy of pleasure. The drive
touches on an area of excess (it is 'too much'). Lacan calls this jouissance (literally 'orgasm,'
but used by Lacan to refer to something more than pleasure which can easily tip into its
opposite).") (italics in original). See also Voruz, supra note 123, at 267 ("[W]hen Freud
apprehends the ethical concepts of conscience and morality, he does so in connection with
the beyond of the pleasure principle. In so doing, he demonstrates the equivalence between
the superego and the moral law, which are modalities of jouissance."); Voruz, supra note
123, at 269 ("In Seminar VII Lacan ciphers the beyond of the pleasure principle in the equation jouissance = ma/ (the French term ma/ means both evil and suffering)."(italics in original)).
132
"Castration" refers to the interruption of the analysand's fantasy, which in tum subtends
the analysand's trauma. The trauma's longevity is in some sense pleasurable, hence the word
"jouissance" to refer to the conflicted relationship (pleasure/orgasm in pain) between patient
and trauma. The "symptom" is borne of this conflict and leaves its mark on the patient, becomes part of who she is. Thus, in analysis, castration occurs when the analyst penetrates and
interrupts the trajectory of the patient as fixated on the very source of her unconscious desire
to prolong and enjoy her pain. This "limit" to the jouissance enables the patient to see, more
objectively, what she is doing, who she "is," in a sense, and to manage her symptom. This
will enable her to live according to the risk of her desire, now recognized, rather than subject
to her "symptom."
133
Jacques-Alain Miller, The Symptom: Knowledge, Meaning and the Real, THE SYMPTOM:
ONLINE JOURNAL FOR LACAN.COM, http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/miller.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
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As in theology, the concept of "incarnation" required by the analyst
to interrupt the patient's traumatic fantasy 134 involves a kind of imaging of
the "incomprehensible" 135 other within analysis. Through the castration, the
analysand's symptom can then be managed, in its turn, as experienced desire rather than limitless fantasy. The analytical experience is contingent,
uncertain, open to possibilities, and radically impure, because the (ethical)
analyst inserts herself, introduces her own "jouissance," her own desire for
limitless pleasure-her own "way of life"-within the analysis. By extension, "value" at the center of law may likewise be conceptualized as impure
and contingent, an interruptive variation on the formal-aesthetic category
through which lawfare sees law as repository of value.
A second salient point concerning the "passage" metaphor between
psychoanalysis and lawfare also hinges on this concept of incarnation: the
sense in which the transformation inherent to the temporal experience is
corporeal, involving bodies and flesh. Lawfare, as an expression of the
asymmetry of modern war, is precisely the "weapon" of a weapon-less other--compared at least to a weaponized airspace/perimeter. Lawfare is both
discursive, involving speech acts, and a concretized de-termination (unsaying) of the fate of the body in view (the enemy noncombatant; the detainee in Abu Ghraib; the civilian "collateral damage" at the border between
an act of war and a crime; etc.). Whence, lawfare as critique of the war
model, by analogy to the psychoanalytic experience, is the recognition of
the body at the center oflaw' s vacuity. In a sense, the genesis of the term,
even as it points to the normative reduction of law to formal instrument
within the war paradigm, also points, like the "terminus" of the analytic
experience, to the limits of war. It points to the carnal horizon of war's
meaning and value.
Thus, the end of psychoanalysis, through incarnation of the objectcause of the other's desire, creates the condition for a "new modality of
satisfaction" that is singular, i.e. specific to the analysand precisely because
it is the analysand's desire, and the superegoic jouissance at the core of her
134
Voruz, supra note 123, at 267 ("In the monist perspective Lacan used the term 'fantasy'
to 'concentrate everything that pertains to libidinal satisfaction in Freud.' All modalities of
libidinal satisfaction (including masochism and sadism) are thus referred to the imaginarized
version of object a organizing the oral, anal, scopic and invocatory drives. This is why Lacan's reflection on ethics in ' Kant with Sade' takes the fantasy as axiom of the subject's
satisfaction.") (internal citations omitted).
135
See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 120, at I 18 ("The intent of this essay is to move theological anthropology away from this sort of fixation on a fixed human nature, this preoccupation
with established capacities and given identities, by diagnosing its theological underpinnings,
and by developing an alternative account of the way humans image God in conversation with
early Christian thought. I show, thereby, how an apophatic anthropology is the consequence
of an apophatic theology. If humans are the image of God, they are, as Gregory of Nyssa
affirmed, an incomprehensible image of the incomprehensible.").
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fantasy.
Voruz writes: "Unlike what the neurotic secretly hopes for in
analysis, the limitlessness of jouissance is the true horror, not castration, and
it is the anxiety generated by that limitlessness that prevents the subject
. out o>/ uesire.,,137
firom actmg
Although the analogy is not perfect, this idea of limitlessness and
the anxiety it generates recalls the above discussion of lawfare's projection
of the war paradigm, and specifically a "war on terror," as perdurable as
empire. Lacan's theory offers a way to think of "desire," specifically of the
analyst in relation to the patient, as capturing the capacity to reproduce lawfare as an alternative to the traditional law/war framework. Like the "neurotic" in Voruz's example, we may secretly hope for "the limitlessness of
jouissance," the fantasy of unlimited power; this, certainly, was Forman's
concern in the immanentization of the war metaphor as it traversed the border between "lex specialis" and "lex generalis." 138 Likewise, Williams critiqued a "war" against terrorism as a permanent state of emergency, reproducing law as (mere) "legality." 139 And it was intimated in Dunlap's solution to the problem of the lawfare campaign of the other: "[W]eaponization
of. .. space." 140 But through the ethical production of an "experienced desire," we might come to see illimitable jouissance as the true horror.
_J

•

V. CONCLUSION
This Article began as a rhetorical analysis of "lawfare": Dunlap's
name for a certain kind of warfare characteristic of the modem, post-9111
U.S. foreign military engagements. I understood Dunlap to mean specific
things by this term: "lawfarc" is a strategy of war, and this might take the
form of deploying law as a weapon of war, or of the "perception" of U.S.
military compliance with the relevant laws of war in order to combat the
"lawfare campaigns" of the enemy (i.e., the enemy's use of law to combat
the allies in an asymmetrical armed conflict). As strategy, also, lawfare instrumentalized the idea of value at the center of legal adherence. I suggested
further, however, that the term came out of a quite specific historical context, a period when the discourse on law and war recognized a certain insta136

Voruz, supra note 123, at 275 ("As such, the analysand may hope to substitute his or
her happiness in suffering/evil for a new modality of satisfaction, involving identification
with his or her symptom that will provide a jouissance extracted from the fantasy.").
137
Id at 275 (italics in original). For Lacan, the aim is to act "out of desire"- see, e.g.,
Zifok, supra note 119, at l 95 ("The focus of Lacan' s interest rather resides in the paradoxical reversal by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one' s desire, not compromising
it, can no longer be grounded in any 'pathological• interest or motivation, and thus meets the
criteria of the Kantian ethical act, so that 'following one's desire' overlaps with 'doing one's
duty.'")) (internal citations omitted).
138
See Voruz, supra note 123 .
139
Williams, supra note 50, at 381.
140
Dunlap, supra note I, at 16 (italics in original).
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bility, as Berman described. 141 That debate in turn was within the context of
an analysis of American power in a unipolar world, the meaning of its interventions, and the categorization of its actions abroad, particularly against
terrorism, as "war."
The Article then looked at the meanings and significations ascribed
to the term by its architect, Dunlap, in two essays divided in time by the
beginning and the "end," at least nominally, of the "war on terror." I looked
at the texts not only for what they signified explicitly, but what they implied, for their textual commentary on the discourses of war and law, and on
the exercise of hegemonic power defined, by some commentators, as evidence of a new imperial enterprise or ambition (and pursuant thereto, hegemonic law as a law of empire). From my analysis, I concluded that lawfare
seemed ostensibly to ratify the ascendancy of a war paradigm.
But within the textual interstices, so to speak, "lawfare" also
seemed to represent something beyond its own semantic intentions. Indeed,
lawfare suggested, in its neologistic form, something beyond the determinate law-war framework. My attempt in Part IV of the Article was to extract, through a thought experiment, what it would mean to use "lawfare" to
think beyond "law and/as war" as a bounded and rather fixed discourse on
violence. 142 This was not intended to deny the violence of both law and of
war as such, or inter se. Rather, the aim was to suggest that lawfare's linguistic innovation signifies itself as a passage beyond its discursive confines. Within the psychoanalytic context (as well as theological, in a different register), thinking past the limitlessness of the selfs desire, or of the
selfs desire as unlimited-thinking precisely into a condition of (self-) confinement, self-limitation-is the imaginative terminus of the self as discursive object. Put otherwise, it is the achievement of political (i.e., participatory) subjecthood. 143 By analogy, if "lawfare" expresses the tendency of law
to "think" war, to de-termine itself as war, then lawfare as passage adjacent
to its intentional meaning posits the capacity for law to think otherwise, or
relationally.
But the departure from a specifically juridical analysis of lawfare, a
dialogic interaction with other disciplinary thought, is already an extrajuridical encounter that interrupts the bounded perception of law that, I suggest, pervades and perpetuates the status quo. Regarding a relational theory
oflaw, Mirza writes:
141

See Berman, supra note 6.
See supra Part N.
143
Voruz, supra note 123, at 277 ("There is a very clear, absolutely crucial indication on
the place of jouissance at the end of analysis in Seminar XXIV: jouissance is obtained
through identification with one' s symptom. And 'to know how to make do with one's symptom, this is the end of analysis' ( 16 November 1976).") (quoting Lacan, on the inclusion of
jouissance in the definition of the end of analysis) (internal citations omitted).
142
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[L]aw emerges as central to the fonnation of knowledge and social organization- to the social bond-and as a 'mold or model on the basis of which
a series of other knowledges- philosophical, rhetorical, and empirical'develop. Law's responsive dimension and illimitability are the domains
where aspects of society can be "interrupted and unmade, reiterated and
made anew." 144

The advocacy of this Article has been to think of, and indeed to deploy,
lawfare as a means of interrupting and remaking the thought of law, within
the shadow of the war paradigm under which we live.

144

Mirza, supra note 9, at 618 (internal citations to Fitzpatrick an_d Golder omitted).

